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LEGAL POSITIVISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
  IN JAPANESE LEGAL TRADITIONS (Cont.) 
                   Mitsukuni YASAKI* 
     The View of Omnipotence of Law and The Positivism of Law 
  -Positivistic Study of History and Its Two Dimensions- Conclusion 
   f This is the third part of translation, though a bit modified in the content, 
of my paper, "Hojisshoshugi" (Legal Positivism) in Japanese language, in: Series 
of Law in Contemporary World (Gendaiho-koza), Iwanamishoten, vol. 13. Each of 
the first and second part of that paper, translated and entitled, "Legal Positivism 
in Japan" and "Legal Positivism and Authoritarianism in Japanese Legal Tradition" 
appeared in this Osaka University Law Review, No. 14, 1966, and No. 16, 1968. 
As to the legal positivism I have written a book and several papers in Japanese, 
by changing aspects o deal with the same subject, as indicated in the preceding 
papers mentioned above. At this time, the paper here is particularly concerned 
with legal thinking or attitude of this sort in Japan. 
             The View of Omnipotenceof Law and 
                   the Positivism of Law 
   I have given above a very brief outlineof the topic, by standing on the 
presupposition that the legal positivism is almost synonymous with the view 
of omnipotence of law, or the "hard boiled" legal positivism. It is really an 
outline simple and yet trivial, only if remembering the fact that the period of 
Japan under Occupation, on the observation ofwhich I gave a special emphasis, 
is merely a part of approximately twenty three years of postwar Japan. But, 
when we regard the period above to have given birth to the socalled "Peace 
     * Professor f General Jurisprudence, Department of Law, Osaka University. J.D., 
Tokyo University, 1968.
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Treaty" system") (coming from the Treaty of the same name between Japan 
and the U.S.) which in turn is giving us decisively important effects, we see 
that it is still relevant in such a sense. 
   By the way, our presupposition is beyond any question, that the view of 
omnipontence of law indeed is a most proper expression of the legal positivism? 
Rather, it is open to question, because, while it was my task to clarify what 
a legal positivism is, I have merely traced a trend of the outlook arguing that 
laws, as far as based on the political authority, are nothing but commands of 
sovereign, and that decision deduced from such laws is satisfactory as well as 
conclusion deduced from the syllogistical reasoning, to sum up, the outlook to 
leave the matter to the socalled "Begriffshimmel" (Jhering) under the name of 
logic. So far, it is only one-sided, and it does not seem to make any clarifica-
tion of the "positivism". Even if we may admit this outlook be synonymous 
with the positive law oriented outlook, we still doubt its relation to the legal 
"positivism". 
   Actually, quite a few ordinary citizen in Japan, excepting specialists in 
this field, does not regard the view of omnipotence of laws in connection with 
the word, legal positivism. At most, they may perhaps find "positivism" of 
law in that word. Seen in this light, an implication of the legal positivism, 
more or less, differs from the context said above. Furthermore, it must be 
also observed that the word legal positivism in English or Rechtspositivismus 
in German sometimes has been implicated and cited in connection with the 
"positivistic" approach to law. That is why the controversy on this word has 
been so much complicated and troublesome. 
   Then, what is a "positivism" of law? First of all, there seems to be at 
least a frame of ideas of "positivistic" method to deal with the law. What is 
this positivistic method? It is, so to speak, the method which is to propose 
a hypothesis on the law in action, to verify it through the experimental process, 
in order to meet social needs with scientific exactitude, thus a method based 
on to a considerable degree mpirical or pragmatic attitude. As it well known, 
the "positivism" in this context was getting dominant in Europe since 19th 
century, by making a sharp contrast with the decline of huge systems of meta-
     1) As to the problem concerning to the period of the Peace Treay system, I shallonly 
refer to a work, such as: Yozo Watanabe, Constitution and contemporary l w (Kenpo to 
Gendai hogaku), 1963, Iwanamishoten, p. 156 ff.
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physical theories.,) This characteristic change appeared even in our vocation 
often pointed out as "conservative" or "Brotwissenschaft", that is, in the field 
of law and legal thinking. Late Professor Eugen Ehrlich may serve as an good 
illustration for this. He criticized the traditional ideas of law and judicial 
process in the continental Europe in the modern period as decisively spoiled 
by the view of omnipotence of laws. According to this criticism, he pointed 
out, the law is not reduced to legal rules (Rechtssatze) monopolized by the 
political power, but to be found in living law, that is, inner order of given social 
groups which is originally based on the relevant legal facts, and since such a 
living law serves as a standard of conduct for ordinary citizen as well as for 
lawyer as a standard of judicial judgment, we need to examine and analyze how 
deeply the morphology of the law is conditioned and modified by such a social 
reality. Here, he emphasized the task of sociology of law as a future oriented 
theoretical science of law.3) Seen in this light, it may well be said that he was 
an excellent scholar of law in the full spirit of "positivism". To look at the 
positivism under the footlight of reality said above, so many ideas different in 
their contents, such as those of M. Weber, Marxism, Sociological or Realistic 
Jurisprudence in the U.S. (originating from 0. W. Holmes, Jr.), may be similar 
in appearance, so far as such a positivistic approach is concerned. Japan was 
no exception to this positivism. Let us recall to our mind late Professor 
Izutaro Suehiro's idea, who pointed out and overcame keenly the falsehood 
of the view of omnipotence of law, in order to make a science of law based on 
a modern mind prevail. He may also well be said as distinguished in the positi-
vistic mind. The more it is true, the more it must be questioned how the 
positivism of law is related to the view of omnipotence of law. Merely for 
convenience, both of them have been identified in the incidentally common 
name of the legal positivism, while in fact diametrically opposed each other? 
Let me cite a . situation concerning the study of history as an illustration, to 
which a criticism of "positivistic" study of history has become a great issue. 
    2) As it well known, A. Comte was a founder ofthe positivism in this sense.As to the 
change ofhow to understand a meaning of the socalled "positivism" since Comte, see W.M. 
Simon, European positivism in the nineteenth century, 1963, and H.S. Hughes, Consciousness 
and society, 1958. 
    3) E. Ehrlich, Grundlegung derSoziologie d s Rechts, 1913, S. 19 ff.
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      Positivistic Study of History and Its Two Dimensions 
   In regard to the method of historical study, too, there seems to be greatly 
complexed implications of "positivism". Its core, however, must be found 
in the trend of idea which rejects to proceed from facts-analysis to theoretical 
construction, that is, which sees the task of historian in a pure confirmation 
of facts.4) Though "positivists" condemn others for their intentional work to 
analyze and interprete given facts in terms of their own personal preferences 
and yet to justify it under the excuse of theoretical construction, they content 
themselves, too, with partial examination of historical data as well as one does 
not see a wood for a tree. Isn't it the case with the view of omnipotence of
law which contents itself to play in "the heaven of conception" (Begriffshimmel)? 
Furthermore, such historians, although being intended intersubjectively to deal 
with historical data, actually interprete them in a dogmatic, therefore subjec-
tive manner, and yet they rationalyze themselves in the name of objective 
interpretation. Thus, the historical positivism is quite similar to the view of 
omnipotence of law in regard to their common rationalyzing function. This 
being so, we see that the historical positivism is reasonably criticized as well 
as the view of omnipotence of law in the field of law. It does not allow, how-
ever, that the task of theoretical or historical construction can be accomplished 
without any careful analysis of concrete historical data. Rather, one needs, 
at least, to analyze and clarify historical facts in their cause-effect relations 
according to the logic of "objective possibility" (M. Weber). The difference 
of this attitude to the "blind" positivism seems to lie, first of all, in the idea 
that its work can never be achieved without any presupposition, but in terms 
of certain clear problem-consciousness, consequently a history based on such 
a factsanalysis, too, becomes the history constructed by certain orientations) 
    4) Professor Sera's survey of a science oflegal history isuseful to understand theissue 
above. Terushiro Sera, Science oflegal history (Hoshigaku), in: Series of contemporary l w,
vol. 15, p. 121 f. 
     5) What I have in mind here is, perhaps a you see, to refer to Max Weber's idea in 
connection with his category of judgment of objective possibility. See especially, Weber, 
Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik, 1904, in: Wissenschaf-
tslehre, 2 Aufl., herausg. von J. Winckelmann, 1951, S. 256 ff. Moreover, see Eiji Ando, M. 
Weber inconnection with his idea of objective possibility (Weber niokeru kyakkanteki kanosei),
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In doing it, for example, a legal historian may draw a dynamic feature of the 
law in the past history from his definite point of view by utilizing achievements 
of social economic history, political history, intellectual history, etc. If we 
regard the matter in this light, we see that the same is true in the positivism of 
law. Figuratively speaking, the historical positivism is almost equivalent to 
the view of omnipotence of law by comparison, while the view of selfconscious 
historical construction i the field of history to the positivism of law in the 
field of law. 
   By means of such a contrast, we may perhaps reach to the further under-
standing of both in the field of law. As mentioned above, it is misleading and 
erroneous to look on the process of judicial judgment as solely a process of 
syllogistic operation, because the argument of this sort cannot avoid the result of 
alienation from social reality in transition on the one hand, it can not avoid 
an impression of the alleged arguments somewhat cotradictory in itself on the 
other. As to the latter point, it will become much more apparent when we 
consider aformal ogician of this sort who, being conscious of his alienation from 
reality, is still intended to obscure his dogmatic or bureaucratic interpretation, 
by taking shelter in a plausible xcuse of the conceptual logical operation.6) 
   It does not come from the fact said above that the minimalof conceptual 
and logical technique is not required in the process of judicial reasoning and 
judgment. 7) It is indeed required as well as the technique of judgment accord-
ing to the logic of objective possibility in the standpoint of historical construc-
tion. Wasn't it the actual "reaction" of the socalled Free Law Movement or 
Teleological Jurisprudence to deny even such a minimal element? As to the 
in: Shiso, No. 467, p. 27 ff, May, 1963, and Sera, op. cit., p. 145. As to the methodological 
connection between law and history, we shall also pay attention to the following notion of late 
Justice B.N. Cardozo, because he strssed "a selective process" in the historical study: "The 
historical method was the organon of judgment in each court, but its application led in each to 
opposite results. One court, in its interpretation of legal history, was satisfied to treat as fina-
lities the precedents of ancient year books. The other found a stream of thought, a tendency, a 
movement forward to a goal. Which, then, is the truer use of the historical method? - We 
need a selective process if history is to be read as history, and not merely as a barren chronicle. 
-An appeal to origins will be futile, their significance perverted, unless tested and illumined 
by an appeal to ends." B.N. Cardozo, The growth of the law, 1924, in: Selected Writings 
of B.N. Cardozo, ed. by M.E. Hall, 1947, p. 232. 
    6) Ichiro Kato, Logic and weighing of interests in an interpretation of the law (Hokai-
shakugaku ni okeru ronri to rieki-koryo), in: Series of contemporary of law, vol. 15, p. 52. 
    7) O.W. Holmes, The path of the law, Harvard Law Review, vol. X. No. 8, 1897, p. 460f.
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technique of logic, the time-honored syllogistic logic is no more the almighty, 
but new trends in the field of logic and philosophy are certainly to be referred. 
   On a rapid survey, we come to see a trend of the positive law oriented 
approach in the view of omnipotence of law on the one hand, a basic idea common 
to a civil liberty minded or sociological jurisprudence in the positivism of law 
on the other.8) This being so, most of legal thinkings around us will be included 
to either one or another, both of which will be in turn included to that common 
(?) name of the legal positivism. We realize here that a word legal positivism 
has two sides. It has an advantage to show clearly a contemporary pattern of 
legal thinkings in a word, while it has a disadvantage to involve necessarily in
itself repugnant elements. As to the repugnant elements, moreover, we must 
pay attention to their evaluation, too, that the former is tended to be judged 
wrong, while the latter right, accordingly, a word legal positivism might again 
split up into two groups. Did we reach to the situation like a dog chasing its 
tail? 
                         Conclusion 
   For a convenience, we maywell to call both together a legal positivism in 
general. To give a special emphasis on its "prospective" understanding, 
however, the matter must be treated from the deliberately examined point of 
view. I shall tentatively call the former, that is, the view of omnipotence of
law the legal positivism in a narrower sense, the latter, that is, the positivism 
of law a "critical" empiricism of law, in order to avoid a misunderstanding. A 
critical empiricism of law, here I called, will be qualified to examine and criticyze 
the legal positivism in a narrower sense, then to develop a positivism of law 
to meet the needs of the community underlying it9) 
    8) Cf. Edg. Bodenheimer, jurisprudence, 1962, p. 93. 
    9) The positivism of law, as far as I outlined above, seems tohave agood enough signi-
finance even ow in regard to its approach of hypothesis - observation - verification. The 
word "positivism", however, has had a certain limit in itself since 19th century, tended to be 
mechanistic or naturalistic partly because of its antimetaphysical attitude. Due to this ten-
dency, the word often has been thought ofas an attitude to deny such agreat postulate, which, 
coming from the thought ofthe enlightenment, tries o resolve problems through human reason 
as possible asone can. This being so, I have tentatively mentioned to the "critical" empiricism 
of law in the text, in order to avoid such anegative misunderstanding to be involved when 
citing the word "positivism" on the one hand, and to reconsider positively ven my point of view
 1969] LEGAL POSITIVISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN 7 
               JAPANESE LEGAL TRADITION (CONT.) 
on the other. As to the detail of the critical empiricism of law, see Yasaki, Legal positivism, 
publ. in Japanese, Nihonhyoronsha, 1963, p. 240 ff. and Legal positivism reconsidered, in: 
Osaka University Law Review (English version), 1963, No. 11, p. 27 f.
